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TERRY V. OHIO IN THE TRENCHES: A
GLIMPSE AT HOW COURTS APPLY
"REASONABLE SUSPICION"
GEORGE C. THOMAS III*

The papers by Professors Saltzburg' and Harris2 are both
splendid-in the best tradition of legal scholarship. Each paper
is thoughtful, insightful, and provocative. I want to suggest that,
in a sense, they are both right. How can this be?
Professor Saltzburg presents Terry3 in its aspirational
stance. This is Terry as Chief Justice Warren and the other
members of the Terry majority wanted it to be-permitting
flexible, cautious law enforcement responses to fluid, potentially
dangerous street encounters, but always requiring the police to
demonstrate specific facts which give rise to permissible inferences that crime is afoot. Professor Saltzburg is satisfied with
Terry, I think, because he believes it comes close to that aspiration.
Professor Harris, on the other hand, is a cynic. He sees the
loose language that has evolved as a Terry standard-reasonable
suspicion-and he believes that prosecutors can drive a truck
through that language. He believes that judges will wink or nod
or doze and rule in favor of the prosecution on very thin evidence. In the Terry opinion itself, the Court fretted about the
burden of aggressive policing on racial minorities, noting that
the exclusionary rule has no effect on the "wholesale harassment
by certain elements of the police community, of which minority

* Professor of Law, Rutgers University, Newark. Joshua Dressler and Dan
Richman provided thoughtful assistance at several stages of this project. I also
thank the St. John's University Law School community for its assistance and, most
importantly, for arranging this conference.
' See Stephen A. Saltzburg Terry v. Ohio: A PracticallyPerfect Doctrine, 72 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 911 (1998).
2 See David A. Harris, ParticularizedSuspicion, Categorical
Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST.

JOHN'S L. REv. 975 (1998).
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
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groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain."4 If prosecutors win almost all Terry suppression hearings, it means the police can hassle just about anybody who happens to be in or near
a high-crime area, which means the burden of Terry's loose standard falls disproportionately on racial minorities.
It seemed to me when I was reading these papers that each
writer is right, in the sense that if the world feared by Professor
Harris is the one we inhabit, there is good reason to reject Terry.
But if the world is closer to that envisioned by Professor
Saltzburg, then Terry may be more beneficial than harmful. So
the issue, I think, is how best to determine which world we inhabit.
More than a half century ago, the legal realists rejected the
notion that law was a science that could be applied the way engineers apply math.5 Instead of pretending that judges are
bound by a rigid rule of law (which would be a ridiculous claim
for Terry's standard of reasonable suspicion), the legal realists
called for a better understanding of how judges apply law at the
"wholesale" level of trial courts. This, they argued, would tell us
more about law than any study of doctrinal categories. One way
to understand how judges apply law is to count what they dowho wins, who loses. Examining this empirical reality would
give us more confidence when describing how law works-in this
case, how.effectively the lower courts limit the discretion of police officers to make stops and frisks based on hunches or on
class and race stereotypes.
Few researchers took the legal realist challenge to gain an
empirical understanding of law.6 The reasons for this are varied,
ranging from habit (if creating or clarifying doctrinal categories
was good enough for Blackstone and Wigmore, it is surely good
enough for us) to the tedious, time-intensive nature of most em-

Id. at 14.
5See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936); Felix S. Cohen,
4

Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L.

REV. 431 (1930).
I do not mean to suggest that there is a complete absence of empirical research. Indeed, an excellent volume excerpting numerous studies is LAW AND
SOCIETY: READINGS ON THE SOCIAL STUDY OF LAW (Stewart Macaulay et al. eds., 3d

ed., 1995). But compared to the number of scholars doing non-empirical research,
and compared to the volume of the law review literature devoted to non-empirical
articles, the empirical literature is tiny.
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pirical projects. There has recently been a resurgence of interest
in the empirical question of how Miranda v. Arizona' has affected police interrogation and the confession rate. Professors
Richard Leo and Paul Cassell have each undertaken recent field
studies of police interrogation (Cassell was assisted by Bret
Hayman).' Closer to Terry's Fourth Amendment "home," Professor Peter Nardulli in the 1980s conducted two major studies of
pre-trial motions to suppress, lumping into a single category all
motions seeking to suppress physical evidence. 9
I do not know of any similar research that isolates how Terry
issues are decided. Without that kind of insight into what Terry
means at the level of the day-to-day operation of the criminal
justice system, I can claim that both Professor Saltzburg and
Professor Harris describe a world that could be the world we inhabit. Stated differently, we can endlessly debate the value of
Terry at the level of abstract theory and never resolve anything
because we do not know whether we have the "good" Terry or the
"bad" Terry1° operating when courts decide motions to suppress.
Professor Harris presented some examples of how lower
courts have evolved pernicious Terry categories as a substitute
for the hard work of applying the fact-sensitive standard of reasonable suspicion." While I mostly share his criticisms of these
cases, we don't know how representative they are. Indeed, a
Westlaw search for "Terry v. Ohio" & "reasonable suspicion"
turned up more than 5,000 state and federal cases. If that many
cases are in the Westlaw database, which consists predominantly of appellate cases, there must be tens of thousands of
Terry cases decided at the trial stage. We need a random sample
to tell us what is really happening at the level of the motion to

8

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogationin the 1990s: An

EmpiricalStudy of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996); Richard A.
Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996). I discuss these studies, and others, in George C. Thomas I, Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A "Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV.
933 (1996).

9 See Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the ExclusionaryRule Revisited,
1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 229-30; Peter F. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 594

[hereinafter EmpiricalAssessment].
10 The "good" and "bad" Terry usage is Akhil Amar's. Akhil Reed Amar, Terry
and FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples,72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998).
" See Harris, supra note 2.
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suppress.
The best kind of study would be one like Nardulli's-where a
researcher isolates the motions to suppress that decide Terry
reasonable suspicion issues and then records which party won at
the trial level. There are two problems in applying this methodology to the Terry issue. First, I could not undertake such a
study in time to present it as part of the St. John's University
Law School Terry conference. Second, and more fundamental, it
is unlikely that a written motion to suppress will always, or even
often, disclose that Terry is the crucial issue. Rather, I suspect
that most Fourth Amendment motions to suppress are something along the lines of "move to suppress evidence found in a
search of defendant's person and vehicle, conducted in violation
of the Fourth Amendment." Why would a defendant raise Terry?
Defendants would prefer to litigate the search as a failed search
incident to arrest or vehicle search, both of which require probable cause. The prosecution is the party who would, at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, raise Terry as a safe harbor
in case the judge found the search and seizure to lack probable
cause. If this is right, researchers cannot use court records to
construct a database, as Nardulli did, and would be forced to attend the motions to suppress or, alternatively, persuade judges
to permit the taping of the hearings. Both of those arrangements are difficult, time-consuming tasks.
Because I wanted to have something to say to you today, I
chose an easier route-a Westlaw search. I began with federal
district court opinions on the theory that a federal district court
is a trial court and thus closer to the actual fact-finding that
forms an enormous part of deciding questions about reasonable
suspicion. I drew a sample of 100 cases that met one of two criteria: (1) criminal cases that reached the merits of the Terry reasonable suspicion issue-here I rejected cases that found the
suspect was free to leave or that found probable cause or consent
to justify the stop and frisk; and (2) civil cases in which the Terry
reasonable suspicion issue was raised. 2 Almost all of category
(2) cases were 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions alleging federal civil
rights violations. In this context, Terry was raised by the civil
defendant (police officers or departments) as a way to argue that
12

Initially, I simply rejected the civil cases without counting them, but when I

discovered how numerous they were, I returned to the beginning of the sample and
included them.
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there was no Fourth Amendment violation. I made no effort to
determine who "won" the civil Terry issue, in part because my interest was in the criminal context and in part because a civil jury
verdict will usually not reveal which issues persuaded the jury to
find for or against the plaintiff. The reason I counted civil cases
as part of the universe was to gauge7 the extent to which civil
plaintiffs are challenging police actions that can be at least
plausibly described as Terry stops and frisks. Presumably, the
larger the number of civil Terry actions, the greater the incentive
for police departments to create and enforce departmental rules
about Terry stops and frisks. Thus, I was interested in seeing
how the number of civil actions compared to the criminal motions to suppress. Table 1 presents the raw data:
TABLE 1
Federal District Court
Outcome
Government WinsMotion
Defendant Wins Motion
Civil Case
Total

Terry Outcomes
Number
Percentage
51
51%
20
20%
29
29%
100
100%

Two observations seem justified. First, civil plaintiffs are
filing large numbers of lawsuits against police actions that raise
Terry issues. Second, criminal defendants do not do so badly in
this universe of cases. Because I am ultimately interested in the
criminal context, I removed the civil cases from the universe and
restated the first two categories.
TABLE 2
Federal District Court Criminal Outcomes
Outcome
Number
Government Wins Motion
51
Defendant Wins Motion
20
Total
71

Only
Percentage
72%
28%
100%

From this sample, we can conclude that federal district court
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defendants win more than a quarter of the "reasonable suspicion" cases-not an insignificant number by any means. Peter
Nardulli's 1983 data showed that, in state trial courts in medium-sized Midwestern counties, defendants won 17% of motions
to suppress physical evidence. 3 Dan Richman pointed out to me
that my methodology is skewed in favor of finding more successful motions to suppress than actually occur. 4 The only cases
that show up in a Westlaw search are those in which opinions
are written, and those are more likely to be close cases and thus
more likely to go for defendants. Nardulli, on the other hand,
had access to the court records and counted all motions. Acknowledging that confounding variable, I remain surprised at
the percentage of Terry suppression motions that defendants
win. '"
I wondered if there was something about the federal judiciary, or the kinds of cases they see, that might explain the relatively high percentage of successful Terry motions. For example,
it seemed to me that a disproportionate number of cases where
the defendant wins were immigration cases. The federal district
courts seemed quite skeptical of the kind of categorical inference
that most concerns Professor Harris-that a person's ethnicity
could be the sole or predominant basis of reasonable suspicion.
As immigration cases were a substantial percentage of the total
(14.6%), if there were a large skewing of cases in defendants' favor in this category, it would skew the results by several percentage points.
To check my federal outcomes, I drew a sample of state cases
(almost exclusively appellate cases 6 ) that met my two criteria
above. There is, of course, still a bias in favor of finding an arti-

'3 See EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 9, at 594.
14Telephone Interview with Daniel Richman, Associate Professor of
Law,
Fordham University (Mar. 25, 1998).

'6 I asked my research assistant, Jennifer Alonzo, to draw a different sample of
federal cases and read them using my methodology. Having two "readers" obviously
increases the chance of differential categorizations. Nonetheless, her results closely
mirrored mine and serve, I believe, as a substantial confirmation of my conclusions
in the text. She found 44 cases in which the government won, 19 in which the defendant won, and 34 civil cases (her sample wound up being 97 cases, rather than
100). Removing the civil cases from her sample, the government won 70% of the
criminal cases and the defendant won 30%, strikingly close to my 72% - 28% result.
16I found one trial court decision in my data set, see State v. Gregory,
No. CR
106283, 1997 WL 781831 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1997), but the other 99 were
appellate cases.
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ficially large percentage of "defendant wins" in a Westlaw sample, and now I faced a new set of potentially confounding factors.
The only way a Terry claim winds up in an appellate court is if
(1) the defendant wins the motion to suppress and the state files
an interlocutory appeal; (2) the defendant loses the motion at
trial, chooses to appeal, and chooses to raise the Terry claim;17 or

(3) the state allows the defendant to enter a conditional guilty
plea and preserve the Terry claim for appeal.18 Each of these
mechanisms for producing appellate review seems likely to increase the number of successful Terry claims in the pool of appellate cases.
But I noticed a mitigating factor that works against defendants winning at the appellate level and thus may offset the biases that artificially inflate the defense victories. The state
courts who spoke to the issue in my sample apply a very deferential standard of review on appeal of denial of motions to suppress.19 Though the standard gets phrased in different ways, its
salient qualities are (1) to presume the correctness of the trial
court's findings of fact, subject to clear error or a showing that
the factual findings are not credible or are not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) to review de novo the question of law.
This kind of deferential standard was approved in Ornelas v.
United States," where the Court wrote:
We... hold that as a general matter determinations of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to
point out that a reviewing court should take care both to
review findings of historical fact only for clear error and
to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.2'
While the formulation establishes a de novo standard for
1'7Of the defendants who appeal, those who see weak Terry arguments implode

at the motion to suppress will be more likely to appeal on other grounds.
18 Defendants who plead guilty but preserve a Terry claim should have, on balance, stronger claims than the average defendant who raises a Terry claim. The defense lawyer has obviously made a judgment that the claim is worth appealing.
191 did not keep track of the number of cases using a deferential standard, but I
doubt that a rigorous count is possible in any event. Many cases do not state the
standard of review being applied, and it is not clear to me that appellate courts
consistently apply a single standard. Rather, it seems to me that they apply the deferential standard when they want to affirm the trial court but not otherwise.
20 517 U.S. 690 (1996).
21 Id. at 699.
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questions of law, the crucial part of making a Terry determination is not the law but the facts; the second part of the Court's
formulation explicitly permits a standard of review that presumes the correctness of the facts found by the trial court. Justice Scalia, dissenting in Ornelas, put it in his typically penetrating style: "Because, with respect to the questions at issue here,
the purpose of the determination and its extremely fact-bound
nature will cause de novo review to have relatively little benefit,
it is in my view unwise to require courts of appeal to undertake
the searching inquiry that standard requires."22
State courts have taken the Supreme Court's invitation to
presume the correctness of the trial court's findings. Ohio has
adopted the Ornelas formulation.'
Nebraska seems similar:
"[in making this [de novo] determination, the appellate court
does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence,
but recognizes the trial court as the finder of fact and takes into
consideration that it observed the witnesses."' The Arkansas
formulation is different but the standard seems roughly the
same: "[W]e make an independent determination based on the
totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the trial court's
ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. In
making this determination, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State."2 The Tennessee standard is virtually identical." Texas applies an abuse of discretion standard
when "the resolution of the motion turns on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor." 27 For example, after reviewing a close
application of Terry, the Texas Court of Appeals concluded:
"Considering the informant's tip and Deputy Hamilton's personal
observations, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to suppress."' The Kansas
standard is about the same: "If the findings of the trial court on a
motion to suppress evidence are based on substantial evidence,
Id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"See State v. Wynter, No. 97 CA 36, 1998 WL 127092, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
22

Mar. 13, 1998).
21 State v. Craven, 571 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Neb. 1997).
25 Stewart v. State, 964 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Ark. 1998).
26 See State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998).
27 Sanchez v. State, No. 14-95-01274-CR, 1998 WL 30227, at *1 (Tex. App. Jan.
29, 1998) (unpublished decision).
28 McRae v. State, No. 03-97-00181-CR, 1997 WL 774524, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec.
18, 1997) (unpublished decision).
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the appellate court must not substitute its view of the evidence
for that of the trial court."29
One does not have to be a David Harris cynic to note how
heavily the Ornelas standard weighs in favor of the party who
wins at the trial level. Terry's legal standard is so loose that the
party who gets a presumption in favor of the facts found below
should win all of the close cases. I believe that the party who
most often benefits from a deferential standard of review on motions to suppress is the state, because the state will usually be
the appellee. Though some appeals in my data set were state interlocutory appeals from a granting of a motion to suppress, I
suspect that the state appeals a smaller percentage of its losses
at the motion stage than do defendants. This intuition is largely
based on the state's powerful position in most criminal cases.
The state usually has more than enough evidence to convict and
can often do so without the evidence that was suppressed.
Moreover, when the evidence is important, the state can offer a
plea bargain to a lesser offense rather than undertake an appeal.
Finally, the state in a sense has less to lose than does the defendant; it is easier to justify dismissing a prosecution or offering a
very favorable plea bargain than it is for a defendant to forgo
appealing a conviction. The state has opportunity costs-other
cases may displace the Terry appeal-and "repeat player" concerns-it has to worry about making "bad" law in the reported
cases. Defendants, on the other hand, are one-shot players with
no concerns about Terry doctrine and no opportunity costs that
would deter an appeal (indeed, quite the contrary).
If I am right that the state is disproportionately the appellee
and thus disproportionately benefits from the deferential standard of review, that should increase the percentage of prosecution victories in my state database as compared to the federal
outcomes (because the government does not benefit from a favorable standard of review at the district court level, at least in theory0). It would therefore be surprising if the state outcomes ap2 State v. Wonders, 952 P.2d 1351, 1356-57 (Kan. 1998). The Kansas Supreme
Court then felt the necessity to define "substantial evidence." I will spare the
reader. The court noted that its scope of review was "unlimited" when the facts are
not in dispute. Id. at 1357.
3' Though magistrates can initially hear the motion to suppress, the review in
the district court is de novo in every sense of the word. The district judge "shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may
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proached the federal outcomes. But they do, as Table 3 shows:
TABLE 3
State Appellate Court Criminal 31 Outcomes
Outcome
State Wins
Defendant Wins32
Total

Number
73
26
99

Percentage
73%
26%
100%

I found the state results even more surprising than the federal results (caveats about confounding variables noted for the
record). That the percentage of cases won by the defense was
virtually the same in both federal and state databases suggests
that the defense bar has found an equilibrium between frivolous
Terry appeals and those with a decent chance of prevailing. It
also suggests that state and federal judges take seriously their
job of rejecting weak or fabricated Terry claims made by the
State.
So what's here for the Saltzburg/Harris dichotomy? Well, I
think they can both tell a story to explain these data. Professor
Saltzburg has the easier story-look, judges take seriously the
job of putting teeth into the amorphous "reasonable suspicion"
standard, and they won't defer completely to the hunch or intuition of police. Indeed, I found cases in my data set where judges
said essentially that.33
So, this story vindicates Professor

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made
by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the
matter to the magistrate with instructions." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1994).
3' My state data set included only one civil case, a false arrest tort case. As this
was a trivial number, I simply discarded the civil case and report only criminal outcomes. The trivial number of state civil cases in my sample does suggest the importance of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in obtaining civil redress for constitutional violations.
Fully 29% of my federal sample were civil cases as opposed to only 1% of my state
sample.
2 I mean, of course, that defendant wins the Terry issue on appeal, not necessarily that the defendant secured a reversal of the conviction.
* See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubia, 911 F. Supp. 1409, 1420 (D.N.M. 1994)
(finding that "it appears that Agent Harrison acted upon nothing more than a gut
instinct or a mere hunch which by chance unfolded criminal activity"); Wright v.
State, 959 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. App. 1998) (noting that the State's "reasons appear
to be an attempt through hind-sight to create a justification for stopping and detaining....).
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Saltzburg's aspirational view of Terry.
Professor Harris can tell a more troubling story of what I
will call the Terry "red shift" effect. If one imagines police cause
to stop and frisk arrayed on a spectrum from clear cause to zero
cause, perhaps the effect of Terry is to shift police intervention
toward the innocent-conduct end of the spectrum. If so, the 2628% who are winning their motions are people who would have
escaped police intrusion but for Terry. In this story, Terry remains a potential villain, responsible for a large number of essentially arbitrary stops, some of which judges rectify (at the cost
of a suspect being turned into a defendant who has to make a
motion to suppress and perhaps win an appeal).
There is no empirical way to check for this "red shift," but
one rough check would be to examine some of the cases to see
whether defendants are winning only those cases in which the
police act outrageously. I offer four cases that I believe are representative of my samples. I will not tell you whether the prosecution or the defendant won until you have read all four. I took
very small liberties in one of the cases because the court's attitude toward the case came through in the characterization of one
of the facts, which I changed to a neutral tone.
CASE 1:
[Alt approximately 8:50 p.m., Defendant Amelia Covarrubia was traveling westbound on Anapra Road in a 1974
Chevrolet with a New Mexico license plate. As Ms. Covarrubia approached the main intersection.., from
Anapra Road, she noticed a Border Patrol agent in a
marked unit positioned close to the northeast corner of
the intersection. Ms. Covarrubia glanced towards the
Border Patrol agent's vehicle, stopped at the stop sign,
looked around to see if traffic was coming, and turned
right (north) onto Highway 11. [The Border Patrol Agent
on the scene testified that defendant looked at him three
times and that she waited at the stop sign for approximately one minute.] Anapra Road is a well-known drug
and alien smuggling route [in New Mexico].
Border Patrol Agent Michael Harrison, who was located at the intersection, has been a Border Patrol Agent
for approximately 12 years. He considered Ms. Covarrubia's presence at the intersection to be suspicious. According to the agent, normally no local traffic travels at
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8:50 p.m. and the vast majority of vehicles that approaches the Anapra Road/Highway 11 intersection travels south. Agent Harrison testified that normal traffic
will not go north; "it's smugglers" that go north from
Anapra Road....
Agent Harrison testified that he found it "suspicious"
that defendant's vehicle had an "out-of-county" license
plate, specifically a Dona Ana license plate, because he
felt that a vehicle from Dona Ana County would have no
legitimate reason for traveling along Anapra Road and
turning north towards Deming, New Mexico. He also
testified that he found it suspicious that defendant's vehicle was big and old, of the type often used to transport
illegal drugs or illegal aliens ....
In addition, Agent Harrison testified that he found it
suspicious that defendant, a female, was traveling alone
at 8:50 p.m. on Anapra Road. His suspicions were further
raised when defendant turned and looked at him and
when she stopped at the stop sign before turning north
onto Highway 11. Armed with these "suspicions," Agent
Harrison decided to follow defendant by traveling along a
sidestreet that paralleled Highway 11. After following defendant for about five or six blocks, he then turned onto
Highway 11 and pulled in behind defendant in order to
check her plates. At this point, defendant noticed the
Border Patrol vehicle pull in behind her as she traveled
northbound on Highway 11.
Shortly after this, she
turned right at the first available right-hand turn....
Agent Harrison characterized defendant's right-hand turn
as an "abrupt" turn and perceived it as an attempt to
evade him. Agent Harrison testified that based on the
aforementioned factors he stopped defendant because he
believed she was transporting illegal aliens.34
CASE 2:
As Agent Garcia approached [a] turn-off point, he noticed
a 1982 Chevrolet van traveling towards him. The van
slowed down, seemingly to permit Agent Garcia to make
his left turn onto Highway 67, and then inexplicably sped
up, nearly colliding with the Border Patrol vehicle.
Agent Garcia had to brake sharply in order to avoid a
34

Covarrubia,911 F. Supp. at 1411-12 & n.2 (footnotes omitted).
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At the time of the near collision, Agent

Garcia was able to notice only that there were two occupants and that the driver was a Hispanic female. Agent
Garcia began following the van west on O'Reiley and noticed that it had pulled into a closed gas station. It was
around 6:50 in the morning and all of the gas stations in
Presidio were closed. A license check of the vehicle revealed that it was registered to an individual in El Paso,
Texas. As the Agent neared the parked van, the van
abruptly left the gas station. Agent Garcia likewise
turned around and continued to follow the van. While the
Agent had not turned on his lights to signal for the van to
pull over, the van slowed down and began driving on the
shoulder of the road. After about half a mile or so of such
driving, Agent Garcia turned on his lights to signal for
the van to pull over. The van did not immediately pull
over, but continued to hug the shoulder for another
one-half mile until it reached the parking lot of the Three
Palms Motel, at which point it came to a complete stop.
Agent Garcia testified at the suppression hearing that
his reason for deciding to pull the vehicle over was to
check the citizenship status of its occupants. Several factors made the Agent suspect that the car's occupants may
be in the country illegally, even though the vehicle bore
Texas license plates. First, the Agent suspected that the
occupants may be from out of town when they slowed
down to make the turn onto Highway 67, overshot it, and
then accelerated, oblivious to the yield sign directing
traffic. Second, all local residents would know that gas
stations in Presidio were closed at that time of the morning. Next, Agent Garcia became most suspicious when
the van suddenly departed the gas station as soon as his
Border Patrol vehicle came into clear view. Finally, Defendant's erratic driving behavior with a Border Patrol
vehicle in tow, i.e. driving on the shoulder of the highway
when the Agent had not signaled for the van to pull over,
made3 5 the Agent suspect that something illegal was
afoot.
CASE 3:
[Shortly after midnight, a Beloit, Wisconsin police officer,
35 United States v. Espinoza-Santill, 976 F. Supp. 561, 563 (W.D. Tex. 1997),
affd, 144 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
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Kurt Wald, observed an unoccupied vehicle that appeared
to be stalled in the lane of traffic.] The tire closest to the
curb was more than three feet from the curb and a majority of the vehicle was blocking the east bound lane of
traffic. The vehicle appeared to be disabled and was a
traffic hazard. Wald observed an Illinois license plate on
the vehicle. Wald testified that the legal distance a vehicle is to be parked from a curb is no more than twelve
inches.
Wald activated the red and blue emergency lights on
his squad car and pulled up behind the vehicle. He got
out of the squad car and approached the vehicle to make
sure that no one was lying down on the seat and to get
the VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) from the vehicle.
As he did so, a man approached him in an excited state,
stating that the vehicle was his. In response to Wald's
request, the man identified himself with a Wisconsin
photo I.D. card as Billy Evans. Evans was talking fast,
was excited, was watching all around him and did not
seem completely rational. It appeared to Wald that
Evans did not want him near the vehicle for some reason.
Evans told Wald that he was not driving the vehicle.
Wald asked Evans to have a seat in the vehicle while he
ran information on Evans on the mobile data computer in
his squad car. When Wald asked Evans to sit in his car,
he had no reason to believe there was any outstanding
warrant on him. He had not seen him do anything of a
criminal nature and had not seen him drive the vehicle.36
CASE 4:
At about 4:00 a.m. [a car passed officers parked along side
a highway]; in the right rear seat was a passenger, identified in court as appellant, who was leaning out of the
open car window. Appellant was vomiting on the side of
the car. The officers stopped the car occupied by the
driver, appellant, and another passenger. There was no
testimony that the car was being driven recklessly or in
any way unlawfully. When Deputy Tomlinson came
within two or three feet of the car he smelled odors he associated with alcoholic beverages and marihuana. In
36State v. Evans, No. 97-2303-CR, 1998 WL 133785, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar.
26, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (footnote omitted).
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plain view on the console between the front seats, Deputy
37
Tomlinson saw a partially burned marihuana cigarette.
To me, all four of these cases present plausible Terry claims.
Perhaps I have been rendered too cynical by the expansion of
Terry, but I would not have been surprised if all four cases had
come down in favor of the state. But the courts in two of these
cases found a Fourth Amendment violation. If you cannot pick
out the two cases that defendants won on appeal (my criminal
procedure class could not),38 I think that suggests that these are
close cases. That defendants won two of these cases also suggests that defendants win close cases that present plausible
Terry claims and not just cases where the police conduct was
outrageous. And now you want to know who won? Answer in
the footnote.3 9
It may be that this exercise is not as reassuring to everyone
as it is (modestly) to me. Joshua Dressler read these cases as
demonstrating that the outcomes of many Terry cases are governed by random chance or by some factor extraneous to the doctrine. ° He views this as a criticism. 41 But it is a criticism, of
Wright v. State, 959 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. App. 1998).
38 Though the sample was too small for a statistically significant finding, my
summer criminal procedure students who volunteered to take this "test," scored at
precisely the 50% level when the results for all four cases were totaled. This, of
course, is random chance.
9 Defendants won Case 1 and Case 4. The key in Case 1 was that the court
found the "abrupt" nature of the turn to be a matter of characterization, and the
court rejected as not credible the agent's testimony that the defendant looked at him
several times when she first noticed him. See Covarrubia,911 F. Supp. at 1418-19;
id. at 1411 n.2. Without the inferences from these facts, the driving episode looked
innocent. Defendant lost Case 2 largely on the ground that driving on the shoulder
of the highway to permit the agent to pass was, considered with the other facts,
quite suspicious. See Espinoza-Santill,976 F. Supp. at 569. It's hard to imagine how
the defendant lost Case 3, but there is a sort of trick involved. The court held that
there was cause to believe that a traffic offense had occurred (parking too far from
the curb) and reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was the driver
(even though he said he was not). See Evans, 1998 WL 133785, at *4. Case 4 also
surprised me, but the court stressed that the car was operating normally and it was,
after all, a passenger who vomited out the window. See Wright, 959 S.W.2d at 357.
How did you do?
40 So, for example (my example, not Dressier's), Case 1 seemed to turn on the
court's lack of confidence that the agent was testifying truthfully. But I view this as
an encouraging sign for the universe of Terry cases-that judges in some cases, even
a few, reject testimony of government actors as not credible shows that there are
limits beyond which law enforcement cannot manipulate the fact-finding process.
" E-mail Message from Joshua Dressier, Professor of Law, University of the
37
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course, only if one's jurisprudential goal is to achieve a just outcome in each case. While that is a noble goal, I suspect it is beyond the capabilities of any doctrine based on the shifting sands
of "unreasonable searches and seizures." Indeed, as I read the
Terry opinion, the Court's principal goal was to facilitate good
investigative police work and to put limits on what would qualify
as good police investigation. This implies a concern with deterrence rather than justice in individual outcomes. Even random
results in close Terry cases will produce deterrence (assuming
deterrence is possible in a Terry context) if defendants win a
sufficient number. Good police officers will not want to create a
risk of a random bad result in a motion to suppress and will wait
until the reasonable suspicion is clearer. Thus, my representative cases suggest that Terry may be delivering as much deterrence as the Fourth Amendment is capable of delivering, even if
it falls short of a precise doctrine that gives the right results in
close cases.
There are, however, problems using these representative
cases to dispel the notion of a red shift. First, consider the perceptive point made by Dan Richman: What we get in Terry litigation is not so much what the police officer was doing and
thinking but, rather, a story that the prosecutor helps develop.4 2
Some form of red shift is thus already built into these cases.
Secondly, even if these representative cases persuade us that
police are not routinely engaging in outrageous behavior
(prosecutors would have a difficult time constructing a plausible
Terry story from outrageous police conduct4 3), that does not mean
that the red shift harm has been rectified. Indeed, if the police
have substantially expanded the pool of people subject to Terry
beyond what the Court intended, the harm is not rectified even if
judges suppress the evidence found in all of the additional police
interventions. These individuals may wind up having to plead to
a lesser charge and, in any event, will have an arrest record.
And this harm does not even include the greater harm: the large
number of innocent suspects who are frisked and who do not
choose to get redress through a § 1983 action. The number of inPacific, McGeorge School of Law, to George C. Thomas, Author (May 26, 1998).
42 See Interview with Daniel Richman, supra note 14.
" I found no cases in which the claim was outrageous. I suspect prosecutors
screen out those cases rather than attempt to create a plausible claim out of nothing.
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nocent suspects is almost certain to increase, in percentage
terms, as the level of police suspicion declines. At the level of
arbitrary stops of people in high crime areas, the yield of Terry
frisks should be quite low. So if a Terry "red shift" explains the
data I found, Professor Harris's version of the Terry story is still
very much intact.
After I came up with the skeptical alternative, I thought
maybe I had wasted my (and now your) time. But on further reflection, I decided that at least the data avoid Professor Harris's
potential knockout punch. I have asked several criminal procedure scholars to project the outcomes of my Westlaw search, and
the estimates ran as high as 95% success rate for the prosecution. If the data had come out 95% prosecution and 5% defendant, with lots of cases of pure hunch being transparently turned
into reasonable suspicion, I think Professor Harris's story would
be more plausible than Professor Saltzburg's. But the data did
not turn out that way, and I even found several cases where the
courts insisted on more than the presence of a young black man
in a high crime area who was standing on a corner talking to
someone in a car.44 If defendants had lost those cases, I'd be inclined toward Professor Harris's view. But they didn't. On balance, my samples of Terry cases provide a bit more support for
Professor Saltzburg's view. But I think we need much more data
about how magistrates and trial judges are deciding Terry issues
before we know with any kind of confidence whether we live in
the Saltzburg world or the Harris world.
So let the debate continue.

4See,
e.g., Coleman v. State, 707 So. 2d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam); Carter v. State, 692 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Carl E.V., No.
97-3018-FT, 1998 WL 18046 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 1998) (unpublished table decision).
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